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European and national policymakers, employers, employees and ‘work-
life balance’ scholars often view home-based telework (HBT) as a work-
life arrangement that has the potential to harmonise employees’ 
professional and private lives. HBT refers to working at home during at 
least part of employees’ contractual working hours, usually mediated by 
information and communication technology (Nilles 1998). Through HBT 
employees can save commuting time (Ory and Mokhtarian 2006) and gain 
more time sovereignty (Van Sell and Jacobs 1994; Tremblay 2002:164), 
perhaps leaving more time and energy for family and leisure activities 
(France et al. 2002). 
Since the 1990s, the percentage of teleworkers in the Netherlands has 
increased tremendously, putting the country at the European forefront 
(Gareis 2002; Van Klaveren et al. 2005). By 2003, about 70% of the larger 
Dutch firms allowed (part of their) personnel to work from home, mostly 
part of the contractual working time. This was arranged for either formally 
(14%) or informally (55%) (Peters and Batenburg 2004). Interest in HBT is 
high among Dutch workers. A large-scale cross-national study in 2002 
showed that about three-quarters of the Dutch working population 
indicated being interested in some type of telework (Gareis 2002). The 
study also revealed that 20.6% of the Dutch employed population does 
telework already; this includes those working from home less than one 
day (11.6%) and one day or more per week (9%). 
Although many stakeholders view HBT as a promising strategy to 
harmonise work and life, a growing teleworkability of professional tasks 
does not guarantee a further breakthrough of telework into employees’ 
daily lives. From the existing literature it is clear that not all job categories 
or all individual employees have equal access to HBT (Peters and 
Batenburg 2004). Teleworkers are most likely to be knowledge workers – 
like policymakers, managers and professionals – higher-educated and 
males (Bailey and Kurland 2002). In the present study we argue that 
managerial aspects such as coordination, control and trust problems play 
an important role. Telework policies may relate to job categories, to 
individual workers, or to both. Assuming that working from home is often a 
voluntary employee strategy, it is also not known beforehand who is in 
power to deal with employees’ telework requests. About half of the larger 
Dutch companies (51%) indicate top-management as having the power of 
decision regarding who can telework or not (Peters and Batenburg 2004). 
In 44% of the teleworking organisations this power is in the hands of 
lower-level management, including direct supervisors (ibid.). Therefore, it 
is not unthinkable that organisations also make telework decisions at the 
individual level. In fact, in many organisations top managers are not 
aware of the existence of telework practices in their companies, let alone 
who has access to it, especially since this is often arranged informally 
(Van Klaveren et al. 2005). The present study aims to further analyse 
which factors affect employees’ access to structural (weekly) HBT by 
looking into work traits at two levels: job category and individual 
employee. But what are the underlying mechanisms that can explain 
differences in formal or informal access to HBT? What job category and 
individual worker traits do managers take into account (implicitly or 
otherwise) when making decisions on who has access to HBT? In the 
present study, these questions will be approached from a combined 
economic and sociological perspective, and theoretical viewpoints will be 
linked to insights from the literature. 
 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Introduction 
Next to a lack of information on telework (Illegems 2001), the literature 
also points to a lack of interest in and even resistance towards telework 
among managers (Bailey and Kurland 2002). According to the 
disruptiveness theory (Powell and Mainiero 1999), managers’ reluctance 
regarding work-life balance arrangements like HBT results mainly from 
their expectation that alternative work arrangements will complicate their 
own work. Managers are said to anticipate problems with regard to the 
management and coordination of work activities, and the control of work 
activities when their subordinates are not simultaneously present (Nilles 
1998). 
Coordination and control problems are expected to play an important 
role with regard to who can telework. This question has similarities with 
make-or-buy decisions that are studied from a transaction costs approach 
(Williamson 1985; Batenburg et al. 2003; De Ruijter and Van der Lippe 
2006). The transaction cost approach is taken as a starting point in this 
study too. The importance of trust is emphasised in relation to the control 
problem. Trust can be viewed as the core issue of telework management 
(Nilles 1998; Huws et al. 1990; European Commission 1999; Harrington 
and Ruppel 1999). Whereas transaction cost theory focuses primarily on 
the characteristics of the employment relation itself, New Economic 
Sociology (Grannovetter 1985) points out the importance of the social 
embeddedness of the employment relation as a way to generate trust. 
Therefore, this theory will be added to the explanation. In the following, 
these two theoretical approaches will be further explained and our three 
main hypotheses developed. 
 
The problem potential 
Transaction cost theory focuses on the management of an economic 
relation between two parties. Every economic transaction engenders a 
particular ‘problem potential,’ i.e. the odds of unwanted outcomes. Before 
a trustor agrees to a transaction, he will make an estimation of the 
magnitude of the costs that are involved to reduce the problem potential, 
such that the risk associated with the transaction will be acceptable 
(Batenburg et al. 2003). The magnitude of these transaction costs 
depends on the size of the problem potential. On the one hand, the 
problem potential depends on the risk and consequences of predictable 
and unpredictable contingencies (coordination problems); on the other, it 
depends on the odds and consequences of opportunistic behaviour of the 
trustee (control problems) (Batenburg et al. 2003). Since transactions with 
a higher problem potential induce more costs, organisations will be more 
likely to chose for a more hierarchical governance structure that allows 
closer coordination and control. With respect to the choice for teleworking, 
which can be viewed as a hybrid type of ‘make-or-buy decision’ (since 
employees work away from the central office), organisations will be led by 
the problem potential of teleworking, and hence by the associated costs. 
A straightforward application of transaction cost theory to our research 
problem would suggest that a high problem potential of certain 
employment relations implies an organisation is less likely to allow a job 
category or individual employee to telework. However, the choice for 
telecommuting can be viewed as a new contract added to an existing 
employment relation, the associated risks having been reduced or already 
accepted by the organisation. In order to understand differences in 
telework opportunities we should rather consider any additional problem 
potential associated with teleworking, as employers will probably be more 
inclined to allow employees to telework when the (perceived) additional 
problem potential is relatively low. 
 
Coordination problem hypothesis 
Employers may be more reluctant to allow teleworking when severe 
coordination problems are more likely. Existing coordination problems are 
even assumed to accrue when work is performed at a distance. Job 
activities may vary with respect to potential (additional) coordination 
problems. Some job activities demand frequent and often unpredictable 
contacts between co-workers, managers or clients. When workers highly 
depend on each other’s input, knowledge and skills, i.e. when their 
assistance is required often, employees need to be accessible. 
Teleworking may easily lead to a loss of communication, accessibility, 
feedback and information exchange. The coordination problem will also 
depend on the extent to which activities can be planned. Unexpected 
contingencies, like rush jobs, can disturb the work process, often requiring 
managers and individual workers to reorganise their tasks. When 
employees have supervisory tasks, the potential coordination problem 
may be severe too. Telecommuting may not only affect their own job 
performance, but also that of their subordinates. Especially since it is their 
job to facilitate, coordinate, motivate and control the work of others, their 
physical absence may bring about problems, such as challenging 
opportunistic behaviour of subordinates or failing tasks due to a lack of 
supervision and feedback. 
Given transaction cost theory’s assumption that a larger (additional) 
coordination problem demands higher transaction management in order 
to reduce the telework risk, it can be expected that job categories and 
individual employees whose work activities can be characterised by a 
small (additional) coordination problem are more likely to have access to 
telework than others. More concretely, employees with access to HBT are 
expected to be found more often amongst job categories or individual 
employees whose work is either less likely to be interrupted for 
consultation and by unexpected contingencies, or amongst employees 
without supervisory tasks. 
 
Control problem hypothesis 
When it comes to certain job categories or individual workers, controlling 
the work process directly is always problematic, regardless of whether the 
work is being performed at the regular workplace or at home. The 
additional risk associated with telework may therefore be relatively small. 
High-grade knowledge work, for example, requires intense levels of 
concentration and creativity that cannot be enforced by strict, direct 
control. This type of work requires a certain amount of freedom. Close 
supervision may even affect creativity and productivity negatively. 
Besides, even in a regular workplace situation, certain job categories and 
individual employees are used to a high degree of freedom. Their 
sovereignty may apply in terms of scheduling freedom (‘when the work is 
done’) or degree of job control (‘how the work is done’ in terms of order, 
method and speed of doing things). With job categories and individual 
workers that have more time sovereignty and job autonomy already, 
employers always face a high, but obviously acceptable, trust problem. 
Mobile workers performing their tasks away from the regular workplace, 
sometimes using online connections during business trips or in the field, 
also experience a relatively high level of freedom. When the existing 
direct control problem of job categories and individual workers is reduced 
by exercising output control – meaning that they are controlled and 
rewarded on the basis of their results (task orientation) rather than on 
actual ‘face hours’ at work (time orientation) – the additional risk potential 
of telework is relatively small. 
Here the expectations for access to telework are the same as for the 
coordination problem hypothesis. Employees with access to HBT are 
expected to be found more often amongst employees who have flexible 
working hours, who have more job autonomy (including mobile workers 
and higher-educated workers) and who are managed on the basis of 
output. 
 
Dyadic embeddedness hypothesis 
Telework decisions are embedded in an existing employment relation. A 
long-term dyadic embeddedness may imply that, on average, employees 
can be considered more trustworthy and thus more likely to be allowed to 
telework. The dyadic embeddedness has two components: the history of 
the current work relation (often referred to as the ‘shadow of the past’) 
and the future expectations (‘shadow of the future’) (Batenburg et al. 
2003). A longer work history provides employers the opportunity to judge 
better whether an individual is suitable for telework (Buskens and Raub 
2002). Selecting employees for telework might be viewed as a form of ex 
ante control (Hales 1993) that reduces the trust problem (Nilles 1998; 
Sparrow and Daniels 1999). Employees’ future expectations about the 
employment relation may provide the employer with some control options 
(Buskens and Raub 2002). In this respect, the type of job contract may 
play a role. Two trust problem-reducing mechanisms might be possible: if 
the future job tenure is expected to be relatively long and/or the employee 
has good career opportunities, the reciprocity of interests of employer and 
employee may generate trust and loyalty (Batenburg et al. 2003), 
reducing the trust problem. Alternatively, a temporary contract can also 
reduce the trust problem since it allows an employer to sanction 
employees’ opportunistic behaviour by not extending the employment 
relation. This can be viewed as a form of ex post control (Hales 1993). 
To summarise, there is a twofold reason to add the dyadic 
embeddedness of the employment relation to the explanation of 
employees’ access to HBT: a long work history with the current employer 
may reduce the trust problem and increase employees’ likelihood of being 
given access to telework. With respect to the type of labour contract, our 
expectation is not directed. 
 
 
DATA, OPERATIONALISATION AND METHOD 
 
Data 
In 2003, unique multi-actor data were collected from 1,114 employees 
working in 30 organisations spread over 89 job categories. The data 
collection was part of a larger NWO research program entitled Time 
Competition: Disturbed Balances and New Options in Work and Care 
(Van der Lippe and Glebbeek 2004). The research design comprised 
various types of questionnaires. For purposes of this study, four were 
used: a written organisation questionnaire filled out by the HRM 
department; a written questionnaire for each single job category filled out 
by the manager related to the job category under study; a written 
employee questionnaire; and an extensive set of structured questions that 
were asked in a face-to-face interview with the employee at home. 
 
The dependent variable 
Employees were asked whether they were given weekly access to HBT. 
Based on their answers, a dummy variable was constructed (1= yes, I do 
have weekly access to HBT). Noteworthy is that telework was explicitly 
not equalled to doing work at home after working hours – paid or unpaid. 
Descriptive analysis shows that 28% of the employees in our data set had 
access to weekly HBT (see Table 14.1 for descriptive analyses of all 
variables used). 
 
The independent variables 
Coordination problem hypothesis 
 
• Potential work interruptions 
 These were measured at two levels, i.e. the job category level and the 
individual employee level, using almost the same set of propositions, on 
a five-point scale. Managers were asked for traits of job-holders in the 
particular job category they are responsible for. For example, managers 
were asked to respond to a proposition saying that ‘employees are 
often interrupted during work’. At the other end of the continuum it is 
stated that ‘employees can work for long hours at a stretch’. Other 
items in the scale concern unexpected contingencies, rush jobs, work 
interference due to mutual consultations, and interrelated work activities 
of employees. At the job category level, five items were used 
(alpha=.69). At the individual employee level, six items were used 
(alpha=.69). A higher score on the coordination problem scale indicates 
a lower telework risk. Strikingly, the two scales were significantly 
(p<0.001) but not highly correlated (.14). 
• Supervisory tasks 
 Having supervisory tasks was measured by asking individual 
employees whether they have supervisory tasks, and if so, how many 
subordinates they are supervising. On the basis of these questions, a 
dichotomous variable was constructed (1= yes, I do have supervisory 
tasks). 
 
Control problem hypothesis 
 
• Time sovereignty 
 We inquired about time sovereignty at both the job category and the 
individual employee levels. At the job category level, managers were 
asked how employees’ working hours are controlled: if they are not 
controlled by direct supervision or by technical means such as a time 
clock, employees are considered to have a high degree of time 
sovereignty. At the individual level, employees were asked whether 
they have a fixed schedule. On the basis of their answers, a 
dichotomous variable ‘no fixed schedule’ was constructed (1= no fixed 
schedule). Employees could also indicate on a five-point scale to what 
extent they were in control of their personal working hours. A high score 
implies a high degree of time sovereignty. 
• Job autonomy 
 Job autonomy was measured at the job category and individual 
employee levels. Measurements vary. At the job category level, eight 
items on a five-point scale were used. Job autonomy refers to 
employees’ freedom with respect to working hours, pace, planning, 
order and style, job content, cooperation and quality assessment 
(alpha=.84). At the individual level, three items for job autonomy on a 
five-point scale were used (.69). These items refer to employees’ 
individual freedom and say with respect to doing the job (Bakker et al. 
2003). A high score represents a high level of job autonomy. The 
presence of mobile tasks at the job category level is measured by a 
dichotomous variable (1= yes, mobile workers present in this job 
category). In addition to these measurements, the educational level of 
the employee is taken into account as an indication of a high level of 
job autonomy of high-grade knowledge workers. The correlation 
between access to weekly HBT and educational level is relatively high 
(r=0.39). 
• Output-related rewards 
 Output management was measured at the job category and individual 
employee levels. At the job category level, managers were asked 
whether employees were given a bonus related to their individual, 
group or organisational performance. On the basis of their answers, a 
dichotomous variable ‘output related rewards’ was constructed (1= yes, 
employees are rewarded on an output basis). At the individual 
employee level, employees were asked to respond to the statement on 
a five-point scale stating that ‘I am rewarded on the basis of a certain 
amount of returns or output’, not necessarily referring to financial 
rewards. A high score refers to employees’ perception of output-related 
rewards. 
 
Dyadic Embeddedness Hypothesis 
The influence of the dyadic embeddedness hypothesis was measured at 
the individual employee level by two factors: number of years with current 




To control for other influences that are likely to affect employees’ access 
to HBT, several control variables were taken into account. First, 
managers’ telework attitude was measured at the job category level, 
asking managers to respond to 11 propositions (Cronbach’s alpha=.75), 
even when no teleworkers were present in the particular job category. The 
items relate to consequences of HBT, like (expected) productivity gains, 
co-worker cooperation and organisational commitment. A high score on 
the attitude scale implies managers are well-disposed towards HBT. 
Second, the branch in which an organisation operates may affect telework 
decisions. A distinction is made between private companies, public 
organisations and non-profit organisations. In the analyses the non-profit 
organisations were used as a reference category. Third, the organisation 
questionnaire allows us to control for size of the organisation. Due to 
economies of scale, larger organisations may have lower transaction 
costs per individual teleworker, and are more likely to allow their 
employees to telework (Peters and Batenburg 2004). Fourth, and in the 
same vein, organisations with a higher percentage of highly educated 
workers, whose work is more likely to be teleworkable, will more probably 
have introduced teleworking (Peters and Batenburg 2004). Fifth, the 
influence of the technological teleworkability of individual employees’ jobs 
is taken into account. The frequent use of a personal computer and e-mail 
may be viewed as indicators of technical teleworkability. Sixth, the gender 
of the individual worker is used as a control variable. Seventh, the number 
of contractual working hours is controlled for. 
 
Method 
Multivariate logistic regression analysis is used to test our hypotheses. 
Since the employees in our sample are all clustered within 30 
organisations, a multi-level model will be tested. As employees within a 
particular job category are not necessarily working in the same 
department, job category will not be considered a level in the multilevel 
model. Consequently, only two levels are distinguished: employee and 
organisational. Since our main hypotheses are directed, tests will be one-






We will now present the results of the multivariate analyses. 
 
Coordination problem hypothesis 
The coordination problem hypothesis is only partly corroborated. The 
chance of work interruptions only appears to be a significant factor at the 
job category level. Employees in job categories whose work is less likely 
to be interrupted (e.g. due to consultation, rush jobs, or waiting for 
necessary input from others) are more likely to have access to telework. 
At the employee level, neither the (experienced) chance of work 
interruptions nor employees having supervisory tasks are shown to be 
significant factors. Obviously, access to teleworking is affected more by 
managers’ perception of potential coordination problems than by 
individual workers’ shop-floor experiences. 
 
Control problem hypothesis 
Generally speaking, the results of the multivariate analysis are supportive 
of the control problem hypothesis. Flexible working hours at the job 
category and individual employee levels have positive effects on telework 
opportunities. Strikingly, autonomy as a job category trait does not predict 
an individual worker will have access to telework, whereas as an 
individual job trait it does. In contrast to the coordination problem, the 
decision to allow employees to telework is less likely to be affected by job 
group characteristics and more by the level of job autonomy an individual 
worker is given. The educational level of the individual worker, seen as an 
indicator of more individual job autonomy, is also shown to be an 
important factor in employees’ telework opportunities. In line with 
expectations, job categories and individual workers who are rewarded on 
the basis of output (individual, group or organisational) appear to be more 
likely to have access to telework than others. The trust problem 
associated with telework is clearly reduced by output control, hence the 
telework opportunity is more likely to be given. When tasks in a job 
category also include mobile work activities, all employees are more likely 
to have access to HBT. By definition, mobile workers performing work 
activities away from the central office have to be trusted. Allowing mobile 
workers to work from home outside of their external job activities is likely 
to be much more efficient and time-saving, and thus more productive. 
 
Dyadic embeddedness hypothesis 
As expected, the number of years with the current employer appears to 
be a factor in employees’ access to telework. A long work history 
obviously generates trust, reducing the need for investing in telework 
management. Having a temporary contract does not affect employees’ 
access to telework. The controlling effect of a temporary contract that was 
believed to increase employees’ chances of access to telework is possibly 
outbalanced by the positive effect of a fixed contract, which was believed 
to commit workers. The dyadic embeddedness hypothesis could therefore 
be supported only partially by our data. 
 
Control variables 
Employees working in job categories in which managers are well 
disposed towards telework are shown to be more likely to have access to 
telework than others (all else being equal). This suggests that not only the 
trust problem itself, but also the risk managers are willing to take 
determine employees’ telework opportunities. Employees in the non-profit 
sector are no less likely to have access to telework. No systematic 
differences across branches are found when a different reference 
category is chosen. In line with expectations, organisational size and 
percentage of highly educated workers amongst the personnel are shown 
to increase the likelihood of employees being allowed to telework. This 
may be attributable to economies of scale. The higher the number of 
potential teleworkers, the lower the costs of telework management per 
teleworker. Larger organisations may also be better equipped to handle 
rush jobs, since there are more employees doing the same type of work. 
Such organisations have larger budgets to spend on IT and helpdesk 
services, enabling information and communication exchange with 
teleworkers and thus reducing the potential telework risk. Technical 
teleworkability plays a role too. Employees who use e-mail frequently are 
more likely to work at home; this habit may indicate that employees 
already depend on others outside the organisation or that they are less 
dependent on face-to-face contact, therefore facing few (extra) 
coordination problems. The degree of PC use by the individual worker 
does not affect access to telework. Female workers are less likely to be 
given the telework option. The number of working hours has no effect on 
employees’ telework opportunities. 
 
The influence of the organisation 
Only those characteristics such as size of the organisation and share of 
highly educated workers amongst the personnel are included in the 
analysis. Clustering by organisation does allow estimation of the share of 
other organisational factors in the unexplained variance. About 42% of the 
unexplained variance is shown to be attributable to the organisation. This 
share is significant (p<0.001). Obviously, not only job category and 
individual workers’ traits may be relevant but also organisational culture 
and environmental factors. 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
The present study shows coordination, control and trust problems to be 
important factors in formal and informal telework opportunities. When 
selecting teleworkers, organisations and managers obviously consider the 
management costs associated with telecommuting. As such, this finding 
may not be very surprising. However, whether managers are led by 
general job traits, individual work characteristics, contextual factors, or by 
all these characteristics often remains unanswered. Given the differences 
in decision power across organisations, both levels were included in the 
explanation. Inspired by the insights of New Economic Sociology, we also 
focused on the social embeddedness of the employment relation. 
With respect to coordination problems, it is interesting to see that the 
selection of teleworkers is not determined by the actual need for individual 
workers to be available at the shop-floor level for assistance, consultation 
or rush jobs. Instead, the telework decision is determined by the general 
picture the organisation or manager has of (potential) coordination 
problems of the job category as a whole. Three explanations can be 
given. First, the coordination problem might be viewed rather as a 
collective problem than an individual one, precisely because coordination 
problems affect not only the individual, but also others (e.g. colleagues 
and customers). This holds especially true when several employees work 
together in the same project. The decision to allow telework depends 
more on group characteristics than on individual job traits. Second, 
managers may allow telework only when the work of all employees in a 
function group is characterised by relatively few coordination problems. In 
this case, economies of scale make it more worthwhile to invest in 
telemanagement and IT infrastructure. Third, telework is often viewed as 
a strategy (by employers and employees alike) to escape the hectic office 
and to be able to work long hours without interruptions in order to meet 
deadlines (Peters et al. 2004). Employees experiencing many work-
related interruptions may have negotiated telework with their supervisors 
at a bilateral level. 
In contrast to the coordination problem, the control problem appears to 
play a role at both the job category and the individual employee level. 
Those job categories and individual workers that are more trusted in the 
regular work situation were also found to be more trusted when it comes 
to telecommuting. More concretely, employees whose time input was not 
as closely controlled were more likely to be given access to HBT. In the 
same vein, output-related reward systems, either introduced at the job 
category level or experienced by individual workers, were found to be 
capable of reducing the trust problem associated with teleworking. 
However, autonomy as a job category trait clearly does not convince 
organisations that each single employee is trustworthy to such an extent 
that telecommuting is possible without investing in telework management. 
When employees are given a high degree of job autonomy at an 
individual level, they are also trusted with teleworking. Two explanations 
can be given. First, trustworthiness is viewed rather as a characteristic of 
an individual employment relation (employer-employee) than a 
relationship between an employer (manager or supervisor) and all 
employees in a job category. Second, employees who are allowed to 
telework might experience a higher level of autonomy in their job, 
regardless of them using the telework option (Peters et al. 2004). 
From the present study we can learn that in order to understand who 
can telework, traits at both the job category and the individual employee 
level play a role, as does the embeddedness of the employment relation. 
Obviously, the social context can reduce the (experienced) problem 
potential. Generally speaking, mutual familiarity between individual 
workers and their employer organisations connotes increased employee 
trustworthiness. Hence, the new economic sociology perspective can 
indeed be considered to be complementary to the transaction cost theory. 
Altogether, both the use of multi-actor data, allowing us to distinguish 
between general job traits and details of individual jobs, and the building 
of a comprehensive framework, allowing us to integrate the reported 
coordination and control (trust) problems into one theoretical perspective, 
can be viewed as adding surplus value to the existing literature. Of 
course, some aspects of access to teleworking have not been addressed 
yet. 
First, our research showed the selection of teleworkers to also have a 
subjective component. A positive attitude of the manager towards 
(consequences of) telework reduces the trust problem experienced, 
regardless of the actual coordination and control problem associated with 
telework. This finding may be a point of departure for future national and 
organisational policies aimed at stimulating telework practices: information 
and positive image-building among organisations and managers are likely 
to stimulate a more equal access to telework. 
Second, our basically economic approach did not focus on power and 
status issues. Still, our finding that highly educated workers had more 
access to telework than others may be related not only to them doing 
high-grade knowledge work, but also to managers’ willingness to delegate 
power to their subordinates (Peters and Den Dulk 2003). Telecommuting 
and self-control used to go together with more authority, prestige and 
status, and were therefore traditionally inappropriate for subordinates 
(Van der Wielen and Taillieu 1994). Third, given that part of the 
unexplained variance in access to telework could be attributed to 
organisational factors, future research may also look into the 
organisational culture (Standen 2000; Peters and Batenburg 2004) or the 
organisational context, such as labour market conditions. 
Finally, the content of telework requests may also influence who gets to 
telework. Our study showed female workers to be less likely to be given 
access to telework. This could be attributed to their motivation, as women 
may mention non-work-related issues in their telework requests more 
often, whereas men may emphasise the need for better concentration and 
meeting deadlines (Omari and Standen 2000; Peters and Den Dulk 2003). 
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